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“The thing to do with a dead horse 
is to bury it as expeditiously as possible.” 
Anonymous 
Seven years ago I reviewed one of Dreyfus’ earlier books on computers and 
cognition [22]. My position at that time was that Dreyfus’ critique of AI appeared 
ill-informed. His arguments for why AI, as a research agenda, must ultimately fail 
seemed, at best, weak. Recently, however, I have noticed that some of the 
controversies raging within the cognitive science community (e.g., symbolic 
processing versus situated action [30], the “symbol grounding” issue [13]) seem to 
have a familiar ring to them. Many of these current discussions appear to call up 
themes that I have encountered in Dreyfus’ earlier writings. Is it possible that 
Dreyfus has been right all along and that my previous readings of his work have 
simply missed the point? 
1. Dreyfus’ critique of traditional AI 
In the introduction to this new edition of his 1972 book [17], Dreyfus argues 
that traditional symbolic AI is a dead horse. He states, “It is now clear to all but a 
few diehards that this attempt to produce general intelligence has failed”, that it is 
an example of what he terms “a degenerating research program” (pix). It comes 
as no surprise to Dreyfus that AI research has failed to make progress in certain 
fundamental areas-he has argued from the outset that the AI research agenda 
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was bound to fail and that this failure is directly attributable to the philosophical 
foundations of the approach. 
Dreyfus’ critical dialogue with the AI community has a long and contentious 
history [27]. His stance is one that has evolved over a period spanning almost 
three decades. It began with a report written while he was a fellow at Rand 
Corporation in 1965 [14]. Though never published in its entirety, this report was 
quite widely distributed within the then nascent AI community. In 1968, Papert 
composed a sharply-worded rejoinder [31] to this report and other early Dreyfus 
writings [15,16]. The first edition of What Computers Can’t Do [17] appeared in 
1972 and was reviewed shortly thereafter by Buchanan [8]. A second edition was 
published in 1979 with a new introduction added by the author. In 1986 Dreyfus 
(in collaboration with his brother Stuart) published a new book, entitled Mind 
over Machine [19]. This book, discussed in an earlier review [22], addressed itself 
to a variety of topics including human problem solving, expert systems, computers 
in education, and theories of decision management. More recently, certain 
philosophical aspects of Dreyfus’ critique can be found in an interpretive volume 
he prepared on Heidegger’s Being and Time [18]. 
The MIT Press edition represents the latest addition to Dreyfus’ long-standing 
polemic. It is still yet another reprinting of What Computers Can’t Do with a 
slightly modified title. This edition includes a long new introduction and reprints 
both the complete text of the original (1972) edition and the introduction from 
the 1979 edition. In so doing, it recapitulates Dreyfus’ earlier arguments and 
serves as a retrospective on his elaborated critique. As a consequence, I will 
concern myself in this review with some of the general features of this polemic as 
it has developed over time. After commenting on these features, I will explore 
some of the implications of his position, particularly in education. 
His critique of research in AI can be best understood as a refutation of the 
hypothesis put forward by Newell and Simon in their 1975 Turing Award Lecture, 
namely that “[a] physical system has the necessary and sufficient means for 
general intelligent action” [29, p. 1161. Although in the introduction to this 
newest edition Dreyfus has begun to extend his critique to other approaches to AI 
that do not depend on symbolic representation (e.g., connectionist architectures, 
“Heideggerian AI”), the bulk of his writings have been devoted to the issue of 
whether or not an adequate model of human cognition can ever be constructed 
through the development of a physical symbol system. He has used many names 
for the target of his criticism, including: “associationism” [14], “rationalism” [19], 
“cognitivism” [ 181, and, most recently, “representationalism” (p. xvii). In the 
following passage he locates the roots of representationalism in seventeenth- 
century, Western philosophy: 
Rationalists such as Descartes and Leibniz thought of the mind as defined by 
its capacity to form representations of all domains of activity. These 
representations were taken to be theories of the domains in question, the 
idea being that representing the fixed, context-free features of a domain and 
the principles governing their interaction explains the domain’s intelligibility. 
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On this view all that we know-even our general knowhow for getting 
around in the world and coping with things and people-must be mirrored in 
the mind in propositional form. (p. xvii) 
Dreyfus marshals three types of evidence-philosophical, psychological, and 
phenomenological-in support of his critique of representationalism. 
Dreyfus’ philosophical argument has to do with the limitations of formal 
specifica.tion, an issue he credits both Wittgenstein [17] and Heidegger [18] with 
having previously recognized. In attempting to represent our understanding of a 
situation in terms of a set of facts and rules, it is difficult (Dreyfus would say 
impossible) to specify all possible exceptions to the constructed representation. 
He describes the problem in this way: 
[T]he database would have to contain urr account of all possible exceptions to 
augment the text-if it even makes sense to think of this as a definite list. 
Worse, even if one listed all the exceptional cases . . . there are situations 
which allow an exception to this exception. . . . Must we then list the 
situations which lead one to expect exceptions to the exceptions? But these 
exceptions too can be overridden. . . , and so it goes. . . . The computer 
programmer . . . must try to list all possibly relevant information, and once 
that information appeals to the normal or typical there is no way to avoid an 
infinite regress of qualifications for applying that knowledge to a specific 
situation. (p. 59, author’s italics) 
Dreyfus asserts that our failure to develop programs that display common sense is 
largely clue to our inability to specify all of the possible exception clauses (what he 
terms ceteris paribus conditions). 
In What Computers Can’t Do [ 171, Dreyfus presented four progressively weaker 
interpretations of the physical system hypotheses that he termed the biological, 
psychological, epistemological, and ontological assumptions of traditional AI. 
These interpretations ranged from the theory that the brain itself operates like a 
digital computer (the biological assumption) to the theory “that all relevant 
information about the world . . . must be analyzable as a set of situation-free 
determinate elements” (p. 156) (the ontological assumption). Dreyfus’ 
philosophical argument is that even the weakest interpretation of the physical 
system hypothesis cannot be sustained because of the previously-described 
problem of formal representation. 
The difficulty for Dreyfus is that this argument is destined to be somewhat 
conjectural since its proof would require him to specify some quantum of 
knowledlge that was, by its nature, unspecifiable. Given the inherent difficulties in 
constructing such a proof, he resorts instead to offering circumstantial evidence. 
Dreyfus cites as evidence the perceived lack of progress made by AI research in 
such areas as machine translation, computer chess, natural language understand- 
ing, and robotics. In subsequent writings, Dreyfus bolstered his philosophical 
argument with related arguments based on psychological and phenomenological 
findings. 
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The psychological argument against representationalism was introduced in 
Mind over Machine [19]. The argument is based on observed differences in the 
manner in which novices and domain experts approach problems. Beginners, in a 
domain such as chess, approach a problem analytically, applying memorized 
rules; experts, on the other hand, are able to evaluate a situation so rapidly that 
deliberation and reasoning from first principles appear unlikely. In addition, 
Dreyfus cites a study of his own in which an expert problem solver was able to 
solve complex problems even while simultaneously performing unrelated arith- 
metical tasks-a procedure designed to block sequential reasoning. Finally, 
Dreyfus points to an experimental study [7] of concept formation in which 
subjects demonstrated better-than-chance performance on a classifying task, even 
though they were unable to articulate the rules by which they made the 
classifications. Dreyfus’ conclusion is that expert performance can not and does 
not depend upon reasoning from abstracted principles. 
Dreyfus’ phenomenological argument was first developed in What Computers 
Can’t Do [17] and later elaborated in Mind over Machine [19]. Phenomenology 
derives its name from the Kantian distinction between phenomena, the objects of 
conscious experience, and noumena, the unknowable world of objective reality. 
It, therefore, involves reflecting upon and recording one’s experience of the 
phenomena of conscious awareness. Given Dreyfus’ scholarly qualifications as a 
phenomenologist, it is not surprising that he turns to phenomenology to help 
build his case against representationalism. 
Dreyfus and his brother Stuart [19] developed a phenomenological description 
of skill acquisition that consists of five stages (i.e., Novice, Advanced Beginner, 
Competency, Proficiency, and Expertise). Within their model, novice perform- 
ance is based only on the acquisition of a set of “context-free” rules. With 
additional experience, advanced beginners come to acquire more complex rules. 
As the problem solver’s level of skill rises, increasing attention is paid to 
situational specifics-problem solving, though still rule-based, involves multiple 
sets of applicable rules. At Dreyfus’ level of Competency, the problem solver can 
support multiple perspectives on a problem. As the problem solver attains the 
levels of Proficiency and, ultimately, Expertise, the extraction of relevant 
situational cues and subsequent action proceed fluidly without reflection. The 
implication for representationalism is clear-rules and representation are only 
useful at the lower levels of skill acquisition (i.e., Novice, Advanced Beginner, 
Competency). To move beyond these levels, the problem solver must adopt other 
strategies that do not require rules or representation, but depend instead upon a 
form of skilled coping. Dreyfus states: 
Since our familiarity does not consist in a vast body of rules and facts, but 
rather consists of dispositions to respond to situations in appropriate ways, 
there is no body of commonsense knowledge to formalize. [18, pp. 117-1181 
Dreyfus, in summary, has developed three related arguments in support of his 
anti-representationalist position. First, because of the limitations of formal 
specification, he maintains it will never be possible to represent everyday, 
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commonsense knowledge (the philosophical argument). Second, citing evidence 
from the psychological literature, he asserts that experts approach problems 
within their domain of expertise in a holistic and non-analytic fashion (the 
psychological argument). Third and finally, based on his own reflections on how 
skills are acquired, he argues that the representationalist model of human 
cognition is not consistent with our own experience of engaged problem solving 
(the phenomenological argument). His conclusion based on these three lines of 
evidence is that formal rules do not appear to play a crucial role in the way in 
which we skillfully cope in day-to-day situations. As a consequence, computer 
programs that depend upon rules and the manipulation of symbols are, according 
to Dreyfus, unlikely to serve as adequate models of human cognition. 
2. Representationalism and expertise 
While Dreyfus concedes that there is no formal proof for his philosophical 
argument, he believes the problems confronting workers in traditional AI to be 
largely intractable and that “all attempts to solve them have run into unexpected 
difficulties” (p. xviii). This is, for me, the weakest part of his argument since, as 
has been pointed out in previous reviews [8,22,31], it is not clear that he is 
wholly conversant with what has actually been achieved. An interesting case in 
point concerns research in commonsense reasoning. It is difficult to understand 
how work in this area could have escaped his attention, given its obvious 
relevance to the problems of formal representation upon which his philosophical 
argument hinges.’ Yet, the extensive literature that has grown up in this area is 
completely ignored in his analysis, including the special issue on nonmonotonic 
reasoning that appeared in this journal shortly after publication of the 1979 
edition of What Computers Can’t Do. Articles appearing in that issue describing 
circumscription [26], default theories [35], and modal logics [28] generated 
substantial interest in the AI community. By failing to even acknowledge this 
body of research, Dreyfus leaves himself open to the criticism of having provided 
a false or, at the very least, inadequate account of the accomplishments of the 
field. 
With respect to his psychological argument, few researchers in cognitive science 
today would take issue with his claim that experts and novices appear to approach 
problems differently (cf., [ll]). Many would also agree that experts do not 
depend exclusively on reasoning from abstracted principles. Perkins and Salomon 
[34], for instance, have characterized expert performance as depending on “(a) a 
large knowledge base of domain-specific patterns; (b) rapid recognition of 
situations where these patterns apply; and (c) reasoning that moves from such 
recognition directly toward a solution by working with the patterns” (p. 18). 
Similarly, Iproponents of case-based reasoning [36] have argued that expert 
1 Mark Stefik (personal communication) has pointed out that Dreyfus’ ceteris paribus problem is in 
many ways similar to, if not the same as, the “qualification problem” described by McCarthy [25]. 
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problem solving consists of reasoning by analogy from a set of past cases or 
prototypes. Both of these accounts would appear to be compatible with Dreyfus’ 
description of experts’ holistic problem solving abilities. His claim arising from the 
psychological argument, therefore, appears to be largely in keeping with current 
thinking in the area of expert problem solving. 
I find the model of problem solving that Dreyfus develops as a part of his 
phenomenological argument to be a little more troubling. His description of how 
novices compile increasingly more domain-specific productions on their way to 
achieving competency actually agrees quite well with current information-process- 
ing models of skill acquisition (see for example Anderson’s ACT* model [3]). 
Where Dreyfus’ model parts ways with these accounts, however, is in his 
specification of additional levels of skill acquisition (i.e., Proficiency and Exper- 
tise) beyond Competency. Remaining neutral on the issue of whether or not these 
higher stages actually exist, I am concerned about the way in which he privileges 
one form of problem solving-the holistic, non-analytic approach utilized by 
experts-over all others. The problem is that though the form of problem solving 
that Dreyfus associates with expert performance may be quick, it is incomplete. It 
depends upon the problem solver having previously seen one or more analogous 
cases. If the problem is novel, however, experts must resort to the same strategies 
employed by beginners-that is, they must apply principles and reason through 
the problem. Consequently, the “rationalist” approach to problem solving that 
Dreyfus decries is not merely a transitional stage in the acquisition of more 
advanced problem solving skills, it is the method by which novices and experts 
address new and difficult problems. Furthermore, what distinguishes truly expert 
performance, in my assessment, is not an exclusive dependence on non-analytic 
problem solving, but rather the ability to apply multiple strategies and ap- 
proaches. 
3. Dreyfus on technology and instruction 
In the period since I reviewed Mind over Machine, my own research interests 
have shifted from AI to education, and the uses of technology therein. This shift 
in perspective has caused me to reread Dreyfus’ arguments in a new way. In 
particular, I am interested in the implications of Dreyfus’ critique for the 
determination of the legitimate roles that technology might play in instruction. 
Dreyfus [19] has divided applications in instructional technology into three 
categories: programs that serve as tools for learning, programs designed to 
emulate the role of the teacher, and programs designed to let the learner “teach” 
the computer. 
The first category is the broadest and, so far, the most widely used in 
instructional practice. So-called “Computer-Aided Instruction” (CAI) has been 
around from the early days of computing. Some of the earliest examples of CA1 
programs were drill-and-practice programs. Introduced in the early 6Os, drill-and- 
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practice programs, with their emphasis on providing immediate feedback on the 
learner’s performance, reflected the behaviorist orientation of experimental 
psychology of that period. Later CA1 applications, such as the PLATO project 
[4], used a test-and-branch approach to present a body of relevant information to 
learners. What unites this diverse set of applications is a relatively simple 
approach to design-minimal effort is made to model the learner’s understanding, 
pedagogical strategy is implicit in the design of the application, and the 
knowledge to be imparted is generally circumscribed and fixed. 
Though cautious in his endorsement, Dreyfus is not opposed to these straight- 
forward uses of computers in instruction. He states [19], for example, “There is 
no reason to denigrate drill and practice as opposed to learning by acquiring and 
debugging rules. If computers can put students through their paces more 
painlessly than traditional methods, more power to them” (p. 134). We will see, 
however, that he is considerably less optimistic about programs which attempt to 
emulate the traditional teacher’s role. 
Intelligent Tutoring systems (ITSs) emerged as a new paradigm in instructional 
technology in the early 1970s [42]. ITSs differ from traditional CA1 programs in 
several respects. First, ITSs attempt to propositionalize knowledge within a 
domain in a way that allows the application to “reason” with this knowledge. 
Second, pedagogical strategies are not embedded within the application, but are 
instead made explicit and accessible to the program [42]. Finally, ITS programs 
attempt to dynamically model the learner’s understanding (that is, to create and 
maintain “student models” [39]). Th ese features greatly increase the complexity 
of ITS applications, but offer the promise of producing greater flexibility in 
adapting to the learner’s needs. 
The ITS research agenda is triply damned by Dreyfus’ critique of repre- 
sentationalism since it calls into doubt the ability of system designers to 
adequately model expertise in the domain, to capture and represent the pedagogi- 
cal expertise of a skilled tutor, and to create or maintain a model of the learner’s 
understanding. Even if it were possible to develop programs that displayed these 
capabilities, however, Dreyfus would still have reservations about a learning 
system that codified knowledge in terms of context-free facts and rules. He says, 
for example: 
The danger is in trying to teach only what can be rationalized rather than 
admitting that the beginning student can use rules only up to a point, after 
which he must be allowed to pass beyond analysis to higher stages of skill 
acquisition, where human tutors can point out prototypes and where 
apprenticeships and practice alone can produce expertise [19, p. 1451 
Traditional CA1 programs and ITSs may differ in architecture, but agree on the 
objective oF using the computer to teach the learner. Another paradigm for work 
in instructional technology inverted this relationship by having the learner teach 
the computer. This approach to using computers in instruction was stimulated by 
the publication of Seymour Papert’s Mindstorms in 1980 [32]. Papert described a 
computer language called LOGO that enabled learners to build their own 
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programs, particularly simulation programs he termed microworlds. This ap- 
proach is rooted in a quite different psychological and instructional tradition than 
that from which the ITS movement arose. Grounded in the research of de- 
velopmental psychologists, such as Piaget, this tradition, with its focus on the 
ways in which an understanding of the world is constructed by the learner, is often 
referred to as “constructivism” [40]. Technology can support construction in an 
interesting way-it can allow learners to build public models of their understand- 
ing in the form of programs [32]. In a sense, the learner learns by teaching the 
computer! 
Dreyfus is also opposed to this approach, which he terms “computer as tutee” 
[19, p. 1451. In the same way that he was concerned about ITSs inhibiting the 
learner’s progress to higher stages of skill acquisition, Dreyfus worries that 
building microworlds can contribute only in limited ways to the development of 
true expertise. He says: 
Thinking of oneself as a computer acquiring and naming features and 
procedures might well accelerate the passage from beginner to advanced 
beginner, and it can still be a useful metaphor in passing from advanced 
beginner to competence. But it follows from our model of skill acquisition 
that thinking like a computer will retard passage to the higher levels of 
proficiency and expertise. Since analytic, verbalized thinking is proficiency 
and expertise. Since analytic, verbalized thinking is counterproductive at 
those higher stages, there are solid arguments that the computer running 
LOGO can be a dangerous tutee. [19, p. 1.511 
In summary, all roles that computers have played in the classroom-tool, tutor, 
and tutee-are viewed by Dreyfus to be of limited value so long as they are used 
to convey abstracted facts and rules. For Dreyfus, skilled performance depends 
upon the recollection of previously solved problems, “since memories of concrete 
events and situations are what is required for expertise” [19, p. 1491. 
4. Roles of technology in instruction 
Much has changed since Dreyfus last addressed himself to the appropriate roles 
of technology in education. Just as the computer, cable television, and telephone 
industries are converging into a single, monolithic enterprise, “Educational 
Technology” now encompasses networks, telecommunications, and video, in 
addition to just computers. An even more profound change has occurred with 
respect to the instructional models underlying classroom practice. There is now, 
for example, a growing interest in collaborative methods of instruction that 
dispense with traditional, teacher-centered activities in favor of group-based 
problem solving (e.g., project-based [5], problem-based [24], and small-group 
learning [41]). Workers in the area of computer support for collaborative learning 
(CSCL) are exploring ways that technology can augment and extend collaborative 
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forms of instruction [23]. CSCL represents a new way of using technology in 
instruction that does not fit within Dreyfus’ simple categories of tool, tutor, and 
tutee . 
Representation is important to instruction (collaborative and otherwise) in at 
least three ways. If offers, I will argue, cognitive, motivational, and communica- 
tive benefits to the learning process. 
There are a number of cognitive benefits to the use of representation in 
learning. The process of representing a complex concept facilitates comprehen- 
sion, retention, and its flexible application in practice. Amarel [2], for example, 
demonstrated that difficult problems can be made simple by carefully selecting the 
right representation. Moreover, the process of constructing a representation of a 
newly acquired concept has been shown to foster a deeper understanding of the 
concept and lead to improved transfer of learning to new situations (i.e., the 
“self-explanation effect” [lo]). Elliot Eisner has described representation as the 
process of “transforming the contents of consciousness into a public form so that 
they can be stabilized, inspected, edited, and shared with others” [20, p. 51. In 
seeking to represent what they know, learners make their beliefs public and their 
misconceptions visible. By presenting their perspectives to others, they enrich and 
are enrichled through exposure to multiple viewpoints of an issue [24]. 
Representation can also play a motivational role in instruction. Scardamalia and 
Bereiter [37] contend that effective learning must be “intentional”, that is, the 
learner must be actively engaged in trying to achieve a cognitive objective. One 
such objective, which seems to be operative within the learned professions, is to 
move beyond and contribute to the collective understanding of the community. 
Schools, they argue, should be structured to enable students to participate in 
“knowledge-building communities”. Representation is the means by which 
communal knowledge is generated and preserved. By providing a means for the 
learner to contribute to the group’s understanding, representation supports 
intentional learning. 
Finally, there are communicative benefits to the use of representation in 
learning. Given the “claim that perception and understanding are based in our 
capacity for picking up not rules, but flexible styles of behavior” [19, p. 51, 
Dreyfus decries teaching methods that depend exclusively upon the transfer of 
abstracted rules and principles. However, communication plays more than a 
transmissive role in learning. Carey [9] has observed that communication also 
serves a “ritualistic” role by which we construct and sustain our understanding of 
the social. and material world around us. Pea [33] has further argued that 
communication can play a “transformative” role in learning-one which en- 
genders change both in those being taught and in the teacher. The problem for 
Dreyfus’ critique of representationalism, is that all communication depends upon 
some form of mediation and mediation, in turn, requires representation. 
Communicative mediation, incidentally, is not only important to learning, but 
also to skilled performance in the real world. Chess playing, the example of 
skilled practice described in Mind over Machine, clearly constitutes a special case. 
Expert performance as it occurs in the real world more often involves coordinated 
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effort among teams of individuals (and sometimes machines [38]). This, in turn, 
requires the sharing of information which is, again, mediated through some form 
of representation. Indeed, researchers interested in developing technologies to 
support cooperative work are paying increasing attention to the means of 
representation used in group work in order to understand what needs to be shared 
and the process by which this sharing occurs [6].’ 
5. Conclusions 
For the discerning reader, What Computers Still Can’t Do does not provide a 
very satisfactory portrayal of the status of AI research. Readers seeking an 
account of the accomplishments and failures of the field would be better off 
looking elsewhere. On the other hand, Dreyfus’ writings would seem to be a good 
starting point for developing an understanding of the non-formalist, anti-repre- 
sentationalist side of the current situated cognition controversy (cf., [30]). He is a 
prominent and well-respected philosopher, conversant in the Continental 
philosophical traditions exemplified by such thinkers as Wittgenstein, Heidegger, 
and Merleau-Ponty. Furthermore, he has been a persistent observer of develop- 
ments within the AI research community from its earliest days. 
Although Dreyfus would appear, on this basis, to be uniquely qualified to serve 
as a spokesperson for the situated perspective, his writings have not received the 
attention that they arguably deserve. This may be due in part to his style of 
delivery which has served to antagonize some readers [8,31]. Beyond issues of 
style, however, there is a more basic problem arising from the incommensurability 
of his views and those held by most researchers in AI and Cognitive Science. His 
position is so different that it requires a Kuhnian shift in perspective before his 
arguments can be fully appreciated. 
Despite these difficulties, however, I believe that Dreyfus represents a valuable 
resource for all those wishing to understand the processes of human cognition. 
His phenomenological argument that cognition must be viewed as an embodied 
and culturally-contextualized process is a position that has subsequently been 
embraced by a number of researchers within the AI community [l, 12,431. I 
would especially direct the interested reader to Part III of What Computers Still 
Can’t Do (“Alternatives to the Traditional Assumptions”), reprinted from the 
original edition, and Chapter 6 of Being-in-the-World (“Heidegger’s Critique of 
Recent Versions of Cartesianism”). The former provides a concise exposition of 
Dreyfus’ position while the latter provides links to the basis of his critique in 
European phenomenology. 
This recommendation, however, does not necessarily constitute an endorse- 
ment of Dreyfus’ critique of representationalism. I find the implications he has 
drawn for learning and instruction, for example to be fundamentally misguided. 
’ See the Heath and Luff report [21] for an example of this type of study. 
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He has argued that representation is irrelevant to expert performance and, as a 
result, its use in the acquisition of advanced skill levels is, at the very least, 
unnecessary and, in the worst case, possibly detrimental. As I have attempted to 
show, however, representation is important to instruction at all levels, if for no 
other reason, because it allows us to see the world in new and different ways. 
Traditional AI was all about representation-defining schemes for mechanically 
storing, retrieving, and applying knowledge. Even if we accept Dreyfus’ theory of 
holistic and non-analytic problem solving, representation and analytic reasoning 
will continue to play an important role in instruction and in skilled performance. 
Foundational work in AI may assume new importance as researchers begin to 
explore the ways that technology can be used to support collaborative learning 
and practice. In short, we may discover there is life in the old horse, after all. 
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